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No Enforcement of Rule of Law, No Tactical Defeat of the Insurgents

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Security Sector Stabilisation at the Tactical Level
in Counterinsurgency Operations

 

The Danish Army has been involved in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns now in
both Iraq and Afghanistan with battalion-size units operating at the tactical level within a
wider coalition frame. Despite the lack of a national doctrine for this type of operation,

these units have sought to defeat insurgents while also engaging local communities, coor-
dinating with government structures and supporting host nation security forces. The tacti-
cal successes have been many; however, the strategic effects have at times remained in a

stalemate, as proper government authorities have failed to reach the areas that coalition
and host nation forces have paid a high price securing.
Over the past year, politicians have become increasingly focused on Security Sector
Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan and on supporting Afghan security forces in running their own
operations. This change in priorities has significantly transformed both organisation and
operations at the tactical level. Initially, our troops were organised to conduct their own
operations, but now they are being organised towards supporting the host nation. It is a
positive development and perhaps the only way towards concluding this kind of mission.
But while acknowledging that this has been a continuous learning process, one may still
wonder if perhaps this focus should be installed from the initial phase of any such mission
and if it should be given more attention in our doctrine for the tactical-level units. Still,

even the doctrine of our alliance partners is unclear on the military role in SSR and particu-
larly when it comes to the lower tactical levels in the initial phases of the mission.

This article gives a brief introduction to the principles of insurgency and counterinsur-
gency to highlight the main characteristics and challenges for those readers unfamiliar

with the details of them. It argues that merely securing areas with our troops will not be
enough to defeat an insurgency locally, but that it is necessary to install law and order
under the host nation government’s authority. Since law and order is often considered part
of an SSR process, this article will discuss the difference between SSR and Security Sector
Stabilisation (SSS). It argues that whereas the tactical-level units must have a very firm
focus on establishing initial security through SSS activities, their role in SSR is more limited
if not non-existent in the first stages of a mission. Finally, it will discuss briefly how the

tactical-level units should integrate the SSS activities in operations as part of the step-by-
step framework popularly known as clear-hold-build. It argues that if the capacity to install

law and order locally is missing, the tactical-level units will have to provide the rule of law
functions itself or accept that only the clear-phase can be conducted, otherwise it will risk
undermining its own credibility and the authority of the local government.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency: Getting the priorities straight

Nato doctrine defines insurgency as ‘the actions of an organised, often ideologically moti-
vated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing

authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the

use of violence and subversion’. Insurgents seek to undermine the authority of the gov-
ernment while reinforcing the legitimacy of the insurgency. They do this both through per-
suasion and coercion of the local population to gain their support. Violence is a means to

destabilise a country, causing the authorities to either collapse or overreact, and thereby
reducing its popular support. Violence can also be used against the population, coercing it
to remain neutral or provide support for the insurgents.2

This definition leads to the assumption that if only the core grievances3 for the insur-
gency can be removed, then, theoretically, the insurgency will lose its cause and cease to

exist. Addressing core grievances, however, is beyond the scope of any military operation.

Military units have a supporting role in the comprehensive effort of addressing core griev-
ances, but we need to keep in mind that military doctrine and operations are focused on

defeating insurgents. Like any other army, insurgents are dependent on resources to sus-
tain their operations. They can draw upon transnational support from interests groups

abroad, and the local population can provide them with material and financial support,

recruits, shelter, and intelligence. The population can provide this willingly, but as the defi-
nition suggests, it is often achieved through violence and subversion. The military focus in

operations therefore becomes to deny the insurgents this support by isolating them from
the population and making it difficult for them to threaten the local population. In the

1950s Malayan counterinsurgency campaign, British forces literally isolated the popula-
tion from the insurgents by installing the threatened population in villages surrounded by

barbed wire and a small garrison of police and military to protect them. Army and Special
Forces then conducted patrols in the jungle in order to defeat the insurgents in what would
otherwise have been their safe haven4. Turning villages into gated communities in today’s
counterinsurgency scenarios, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, is probably an impossible
task. The idea, however, remains the same: Establish law and order in the populated areas
and provide human security while striking the insurgents in their safe havens.
Nato, UK and US doctrines all emphasize in their principles for counterinsurgency the
political primacy and need for legitimacy, the unity and coordination of the military and
civilian effort, the isolation of the insurgents, and that security under the rule of law is
essential5. To restate this in simple terms, a counterinsurgency campaign must at all levels
isolate the insurgents from the population and their resource bases while addressing the
core grievances that drive the insurgency. A key element in this, which directly involves the

tactical-level units, is to establish law and order under the authority of the local govern-
ment.

Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Stabilisation:
First things first

According to the OECD, SSR is defined as ‘seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to

meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democ-
ratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR

includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assis-
tance on defence, intelligence and policing.’6 SSR is, in other words, not merely a matter of

building or downsizing a military or police force – it is about political reform. It is about

ensuring that the state upholds law and order on its own territory efficiently, that it is fi-
nancially sustainable and in accordance with good governance principles as well as the

needs and beliefs of the civil society for whom it is there to protect. It includes the legisla-
tive, judicial and executive powers, and therefore not only police or military, but also gov-
ernment bodies, courts, prisons, private security companies, and civil society bodies.

SSR can be particularly critical to consolidate the peace and stability in a post-conflict

state. Over the past decade SSR has received increased attention in both Iraq and Af-
ghanistan as it is believed to address both the security issue as well as the core griev-
ances. However, development and reform of state institutions as well as the strengthening

of the relationship between state institutions and civil society require a certain level of

security. In the article “A Model for Security Sector Stabilisation in Counterinsurgency Op-
erations: Case Afghanistan”, P.D. Thruelsen argues that because SSR was not originally

developed as an element in stabilising a state undergoing an insurgency, but is used for
exactly that, the short-term objectives of establishing security can endanger the long-term
process of actual and sustainable reform. In a counterinsurgency campaign the need for

security initially becomes a matter of expanding, training, and equipping the state’s secu-
rity forces. Thruelsen therefore argues that ‘the baseline will ultimately have to be Security

Sector Stabilisation (SSS) as precondition for complete SSR implementation’. He further

argues that conflicting interests between providing security rapidly and reforming institu-
tions while involving civil society will complicate the implementation, often resulting in

fragile and stand-alone solutions7. It is therefore necessary to make a clear distinction

between SSR and SSS, as the military role is significantly different in the two. For the tacti-
cal-level units in a counterinsurgency campaign it becomes a matter of Security Sector

Stabilisation, not Reform.

The military role in security sector reform and stabilisation:
The problems down in the mud

Nato, UK, and US doctrines for counterinsurgency all emphasize the need for developing
the host-nation’s security forces and all make reference to the principles of SSR and SSS.
The American field manual on counterinsurgency has a chapter devoted to this theme
under the title “Developing Host Nation Security Forces”, which states the purpose clearly
with this quotation: ‘Helping others to help themselves is critical to winning the long war’8.
All doctrines have a clear focus on building, training, equipping, and mentoring or advising

the host nation’s military and police. The doctrines are focused on creating more forces
that can fight insurgents, but they remain unclear of what our tactical-level units are to do
in order to ensure either the short-term stabilisation or the long-term reformation, or both.
Increasing the total level and the efficiency of the security forces is a very good start, but

not necessarily enough to isolate the insurgents from the population’s active or tacit sup-
port, nor reduce the core grievances.

This is perhaps the crux of the problem that tactical-level units have been facing in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. Battalion or company sized units occupy new areas and defeat
all insurgents opposing them. Bases are built, regular patrolling commenced, and liaison
is established with the local community. If not already there, host nation military units or
police arrive later and join the patrolling. There are, however, no other government or state

bodies present in the area, and the civil society therefore continues to function on its tradi-
tional principles. After a while, the insurgents become fully aware of our unit’s operational

patterns, and occasionally they harass patrols and checkpoints in order to inflict losses.
The insurgents prove to the local population that they can oppose the security forces, and
the attrition makes our troops and homelands weary and impatient. The damage inflicted
on civilians and their property in these encounters makes the environments insecure for

the local population. In the meantime, insurgents operate among the people as non-
combatants and out of sight of the security forces. The local population continues to be

coerced – at a minimum into remaining neutral, but in most cases into actively supporting
the insurgents through the provision of food, shelter, and money. At times, the situation
even reaches a point where the local population wants the security forces to withdraw so
that combat activities will cease. Even though highly-trained coalition forces are present in
the area, there is no formal enforcement of the rule of law. If the local population wishes to

report a crime to the local authorities, there are none – or those that are may still be dys-
functional and corrupt. The insurgents exploit this and act instead as the governing author-
ity as they can exert justice swiftly and in accordance with local customs – perhaps even

with satisfactory outcomes for all parties involved. When the presence of the security
forces cannot extend the host nation government’s authority through the establishment of
law and order, it fails to provide security for the local population and fails to promote the
government’s legitimacy.

What often seems to happen is that the tactical-level units get bogged down. The envi-
ronment is still non-permissive for state bodies and development organisations to com-
mence the political, economic, and social activities as well as proper law enforcement. The

tactical-level units are efficient in combat operations but cannot install rule of law by their
own means. Instead, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units undertake various projects
with the civil society, promoting the image of the security forces and trying to win the
hearts and minds of the locals. While kind-hearted in their nature, and used for publicity in
our homelands, these CIMIC projects often aim at winning consent for the coalition force
rather than promoting the authority of the local government. The local population therefore
has to balance its engagement with the security forces with that of the insurgents. One day
soon, the security forces will have left the area and the insurgents will be the only authority
remaining. The security forces try to offer the carrot, but all along it is the insurgents that
have the stick. The words of John Wayne describe well the approach of the insurgents: “If
you’ve got them by the balls their hearts and minds will follow.”

Integrating security sector stabilisation with
tactical-level unit operations: New sheriff in town

Nato, UK, and US counterinsurgency doctrines provide a simple step-by-step framework for
operations: the three phases of Clear, Hold, and Build9. The logic is simple: A geographical
area of importance to the overall campaign is selected and military forces are employed to
clear it for insurgents and to secure the area. Once cleared, military forces hold the area
so that host nation security forces gradually can take over the responsibility for upholding
security and keeping the insurgents out. Once host nation government bodies and security

forces have been installed, the focus changes to the actual development effort that ad-
dresses the core grievances and builds the government’s legitimacy and capability.

The theory is simple, but as stated above, the problem seems to be that the tactical-
level units often get bogged down in the hold phase. The problem can be two-fold: 1) Mili-
tary units initiate a clear phase well before means have been made available for a hold

phase. The units thereby overstretch their own and the host nation’s capacity and under-
mine their credibility as a force capable of providing security. 2) The military units are run-
ning along with their own campaign plan detached from the broader governance institu-
tions within the host nation. This may be because the units seek to stress the insurgents

by denying them safe havens, or because there is a political pressure to clear and secure

certain areas. The result, however, can be that they undermine national control, owner-
ship, and the long-term objectives of reforming the security sector as a whole. Naturally, all

sorts of compromises have to be made when fighting an insurgency while being under

pressure to produce visible results. At this point, however, it is necessary to balance short-
term priorities with long-term objectives, and to set the level of ambition according to ac-
tual capacity.

Prior to the clear phase, a unit at any level must define carefully what it sets out to

achieve before it launches its operation. If clear of insurgent presence in an area is neces-
sary for the long-term objectives, then the means to hold must be made available first. If

the host nation does not yet have this capacity, the tactical-level unit should lower its level
of ambition – for example by conducting raids with the limited objective of striking the
insurgents, but not securing the area. Alternatively, the unit itself must install rule of law
under what would in fact be martial law – i.e. the imposition of military rule by military
authorities on an emergency basis when civilian authorities fail to function effectively.
Agreeing upon objectives, coordinating with, supporting and training host nation security
forces and local governance institutions therefore becomes a vital part of the shaping prior
to commencing a clear-hold-build operation.
The clear phase is perhaps the most straightforward phase and what our units are
best suited for. The clear phase will typically be carried out an offensive operation with the
aim of defeating any armed resistance and securing the area. Whether our forces are in a
lead or supporting role to host nation security forces, or carry it out alone, will depend on
the host nation’s capacity. Active involvement of the host nation authorities and ownership
of the clear phase should of course be given priority.

The hold phase is where security for the local population is established through the es-
tablishment of law and order. This is where local military or police start taking over the law

enforcement and rule of law bodies must start functioning – such as a local governing
authority and justice bodies. There is no Security Sector Reform taking place in this phase,
but it is strictly a matter of introducing a formal, even if rudimentary, security sector into
the area – i.e. Security Sector Stabilisation. Ideally, the role of tactical-level units in this
phase is to support local governance, justice and police – or military – in enforcing rule of

law. This can be done through daily mentoring or advising both in the field and in the of-
fices, as well as supporting when carrying out operations to find or strike insurgent cells. If,

however, the unit is taking the lead role in the hold phase, it should be because the area is
being controlled under martial law. This implies that tactical-level units must perform the
functions of local administration, police, courts, and prisons – functions which our units
are not traditionally trained nor staffed for. What is decisive for the hold phase, however, is
that the ungoverned space – or power vacuum created after the insurgents were expelled
– is filled out quickly by formal rule of law bodies. In other words, it must be made clear

that there is a new sheriff in town – an authority that represents the legitimate govern-
ment.

The build phase can begin when the necessary host nation governance and security
bodies are in place and when law and order has been established so that government
institutions and non-governmental organisations can start rebuilding and developing local
economy, infrastructures, and civil society. Our tactical-level units are to be exclusively in a
supporting role. It is also in the build phase that actual SSR activities start taking place,
which have the aim of establishing effective governance, oversight, and accountability in
the security system, improving the delivery of services and ensuring its sustainability. This
is where we need to be realistic in our expectations to the role of tactical-level units – they
are combat units that can coordinate, support, train, and advise host nation security
forces, but they cannot reform a local security sector, develop institutions, or empower the
civil society.

Conclusions
At the tactical level, combat units carrying out clear-hold-build operations must retain a

careful focus on establishing law and order that will protect the local population. The Brit-
ish doctrine manual for stability operations sums this up neatly in its definition of protect-
ing the population: ‘Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet human security

needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs,

including adversarial groups such as insurgents and foreign fighters, as well as belliger-
ents and opportunists. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money,

basic social services and a crude form of justice. Winning the contest for human security
therefore, is fundamental to the development of host nation government authority and,
ultimately security of the state.’10 Units at the tactical level can be employed to conduct
operations against insurgents to disrupt them, degrade their numbers, and deny them
freedom of movement and their safe havens. However, these activities are not enough to
provide human security and often not even enough to isolate the insurgents from the
population. When securing an area, unit commanders therefore need to keep in mind that
the insurgents are still there among the population, coercing them and drawing upon their
support. Rule of law is the key to human security so that the local population, as citizens,

have an authority to turn to when they are being threatened, stolen from, forced to labour,
or have witnessed criminal activity.
All operations must, of course, be tightly interwoven with the host nation’s authorities
and security forces’ operations. It is, after all, their country and their territory. Tactical-level

units play an important role in the Security Sector Stabilisation, which has the aim of ena-
bling essential and minimum security functions to be established and maintained11. Secu-
rity Sector Reform, however, has a different, much broader, and political aim, which is to

enable good governance, proper service delivery, and financial sustainability in the security
sector. The tactical-level units’ capacity and role in SSR activities are therefore limited –
their focus remain on providing security, either themselves or in conjunction with the host
nation’s security forces. Political and strategic decision-makers must keep in mind that

tactical-level units are not employed to conduct Security Sector Reform, nor run or coordi-
nate all the strings of a counterinsurgency campaign. Tactical-level units conduct combat

operations against insurgents and work to provide human security for the local population
in conjunction with the host nation’s security forces – they work to stabilise the situation
so that other actors can enter the area and commence development, reconstruction, and
reform.
In a counterinsurgency campaign, however, merely securing an area with tactical units
is not enough to provide human security. It requires proper law enforcement and justice
bodies or the insurgents will otherwise continue to work in the shadows and fill out the

ungoverned space. If the host nation’s rules of law bodies are inadequate or still non-
existent, the power vacuum has to be filled out by other means. Other means may essen-
tially end up being the responsibility of even tactical-level units, which will then have to

install martial law locally while promoting the authority of the legitimate government. If rule
of law is not installed, tactical-level units end up getting bogged down in a continuous clear
phase, where the fight against the insurgents become a local war of attrition – a war the

insurgents will have won the moment the units are transferred elsewhere. Decision-
makers at all levels need to be conscious of this riling dilemma that merely sending our

combat units will not be enough, but installing an immediate even if rudimentary authority
that can uphold rule of law is key. Basic and immediate law and order may, if necessary,
have to be provided through local martial law, where combat units take on the temporary
role of the local government, the judge, the police, and the prison. Our units are not
trained or staffed for these functions, but in the future it may be the focus of CIMIC and
other supporting elements.

Fodnoter

1 This article was written as part of the Conflict Management module at the Senior Joint

Staff Course, Royal Danish Defence College, in May 2011, where the author was a stu-
dent. In 2009, prior to Senior Joint Staff Course and Army General Staff Course, the author

was Executive Officer and assistant to the Commander of the Danish Battlegroup in Hel-
mand, Afghanistan.

2 Nato “AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency” (Ratification Draft 2, 2010),
para. 0302-3

3 Nato doctrine discusses core grievances more in detail in AJP 3-4.4 para. 309

4 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. London: Penguin Group, 2006, p. 204 5 Nato “AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency” (Ratification Draft 2, 2010),
para. 0333 (Nato doctrine refers to these principles as attributes); UK Ministry of Defence,
“AC71749 Part 10 Counterinsurgency Operations” (Issue 2), March 2007, ch. 3 para. 5;
U.S. Army, ”FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency”, December 2006, para. 1-112 to 1-147

6 Global Facilitation Forum for Security Sector Reform, “A Beginner’s Guide to Security
Sector Reform (SSR)”, December 2007, www.ssrnetwork.net

7 Thruelsen, Peter Dahl, A Model for Security Sector Stabilisation in Counterinsurgency
Operations: Case Afghanistan. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2011, pp. 1,
4-10

8 U.S. Army, ”FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency”, December 2006, p. 6-1

9 Clear-Hold-Build has its origins from the Malayan campaign. It has been used widely in
both Iraq in Afghanistan and since then been written into US doctrine and now also Nato
doctrine. British doctrine for stability operations name the phases Secure-Hold-Develop
(UK JDP 3-40).

10 UK Ministry of Defence, “X JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribu-
tion” (Ratification Draft, 2009), para. 513

11 Thruelsen, Peter Dahl, A Model for Security Sector Stabilisation in Counterinsurgency
Operations: Case Afghanistan. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2011, pp. 1,
4-10